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Abstract
This paper examines the restructuring of state assets in markets deregulated by
privatizations and investment liberalizations. We show that the government has
a stronger incentive to restructure than the buyer: A ﬁrm restructuring only takes
into account how much its own proﬁt will increase. The government internalizes that
restructuring increases the sales price not only from the increase in the acquirer’s
proﬁt, but also from a reduced proﬁt for the non-acquirer, whose proﬁts decrease
due to its rival’s restructuring. We also identify situations where a slow sale can sig-
niﬁcantly reduce the sales price because of strategic investment and product market
eﬀects.
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In liberalization and privatization programs, we observe that governments use (or encour-
age) diﬀerent types of restructuring prior to privatization (liberalization). Speciﬁca r e a s
of restructuring include (1) a change in management and labor, (2) eﬃciency programs
and (3) investment and de-investment programs.1 This presents a puzzle: Why would
a government restructure state assets instead of leaving it for the buyer to decide? The
private buyer should be able to achieve eﬃciency goals at the same cost and more in line
with her speciﬁcn e e d s .
In the literature, informational, political and ﬁnancial restrictions have been suggested
to explain why governments should (sequentially) restructure prior to privatization. (See
for instance, Roland (1994)). In contrast, this paper takes as its starting point that many
of these restructuring programs have been carried out in oligopolistic markets, includ-
ing the manufacturing sector, utility and communication services as well as the ﬁnancial
sector.2 In this paper we show that in an oligopoly, a government may have a stronger
incentive to restructure than a buyer of the privatized ﬁrm. Emphasizing oligopolistic
interaction, we thus provide an additional explanation of why governments restructure
prior to privatizations.
1 This was the case in, for instance, the Mexican privatization program in the 1980s and
1990s, see (Lopez-de-Silanes 1997). Moreover, British Steel, prior to its privatization, cut em-
ployment by 40 % without loosing sales, while British Airways experienced a similar reduction
of employment, while increasing the number of ﬂights, see Djankov and Pohl (1997).
2 Many countries also announce substantial forthcoming privatizations. Planned privatizations
suggest that privatization proceeds will remain strong through continued activitities in Europe
and Asia. Examples of countries with large privatization plans are China, Japan, Portugal,
Thailand and Turkey (OECD (2000)).
2In the model there is initially a market which has previously been served by a state
enterprise, which possesses local productive assets. The government then liberalizes the
market through a program with two distinct measures: (i) selling the state assets, and (ii)
deregulating the market by abolishing investment restrictions. In stage 0, the government
may restructure the state assets and thereby improve the proﬁtability of their use in the
product market. In stage 1, the (restructured) state assets will be sold at an auction where
two ﬁrms simultaneously post bids and the bidder with the highest bid obtains the state
assets. In stage 2, the acquirer has the option of further restructuring the state assets.
In stage 3, the non-acquiring ﬁrm invests in capital in order to be able to produce in the
product market. In stage 4, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion generating proﬁts.
We show that the government has a stronger incentive to restructure than a private
buyer, since the government internalizes externalities on rival ﬁrms via the sales price of
the privatized ﬁrm. A ﬁrm restructuring takes into account how much its own proﬁt will
increase from the process. The government, on the other hand, takes into account how the
acquisition price is aﬀected. The acquisition price is, in equilibrium, shown to be equal to
a ﬁrm’s valuation of obtaining the state assets. A ﬁrm’s valuation, in turn, consists of the
proﬁtf o rt h i sﬁrm when obtaining the state assets, net of the proﬁtf o rt h i sﬁrm when the
rival ﬁrm obtains them. The government then internalizes that restructuring increases the
sales price, not only from generating an increase in the acquirer’s proﬁt, but also through
the negative impact on the non-acquirer’s proﬁt as an outcome of the restructuring.
There is, however, some recent evidence showing that restructuring policies can be
very costly. Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) estimates that the direct cost of prior restructuring
3policies delaying the privatization process, amounted to an average of 33% of the sales
price in Mexico. A slow sale of the assets may lead to lower productivity due to, for
instance, managerial distraction, misconduct and lost investment opportunities. In a situ-
ation without oligopolistic interaction, the a c q u i s i t i o np r i c ew o u l dt h e nd e c r e a s ew i t ht h e
amount of waste. However, we show that in an oligopoly a slow sale of the state assets
will have strategic investment and product market eﬀects, that can lead to a substantially
larger reduction of the sales price. We identify two diﬀerent situations where a slow sale
will reduce the sale price substantially as a result of strategic eﬀects. The ﬁrst, is when a
slow sale implies that the acquirer will not have time to commit to sequential investments
before the other ﬁrms make their investment decisions. The second, is when early entry
provide the acquiring ﬁrm with a competitive advantage in the ensuing product market
competition. For instance, an early entry could be crucial in creating consumer loyalty
before rivals are present in the market. A slow sale will, in these situations reduce a ﬁrm’s
valuation of the state assets, and hence the sales price, for two reasons: (i) it reduces
the acquiring ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt, and (ii) it increases the non-acquiring ﬁrm’s
product market proﬁt.
To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst in the theoretical privatization literature or
transition literature, to examine privatizations in a situation where potential buyers can
invest in new capital and compete in an asymmetric oligopoly.34
3 For overviews of the privatization literature see, for instance, Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997)
and Vickers and Yarrow (1991).
4 A related paper is Bennett and Maw (2002). However, the focus of their paper is to derive
the welfare-maximizing retained ownership share for the state in a symmetric oligopoly, while
we study restructuring incentives in an asymmetric oligopoly.
















Figure 2.1: The structure of the game.
The model is spelt out in Section 2 and in Section 3, we derive the equilibrium restruc-
turing and investment pattern and examine how government and private incentives may
diﬀer in restructuring. In Section 4, the eﬀects of a delayed privatization are analyzed.
Section 5 is the conclusion.
2. The Model
Let us start with a brief overview of the model. Consider a country where the market has
previously been served by a state enterprise, which possesses k0 units of productive assets.
The government will liberalize the market through a program with two distinct measures:
(i) selling the state assets, and (ii) deregulating the market by abolishing investment
restrictions. The interaction takes place in ﬁve stages, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
In stage 0, the government may restructure the state-assets k0 to kG and thereby
improve the proﬁtability of using the assets in the product market. In stage 1, the state
assets will be privatized. The privatization process is depicted as an auction5 where two
5 In order to focus on the market forces as the determinants of the equilibrium market struc-
ture, we assume that the government sells the state assets to the highest bidder at an auction.
Several western countries employ various kinds of auctions to sell state-owned enterprises to the
5ﬁrms simultaneously post bids, bi, and the bidder with the highest bid obtains the state
assets.6 If more than one ﬁrm posts such a bid, each such ﬁrm obtains the assets with
equal probability. The winning buyer pays an amount equal to his bid.
In stage 2, the acquirer has the option of further restructuring state assets from kG
to kA improving the proﬁtability of using these assets even further. In stage 3, the non-
acquiring ﬁrm invest in capital kNA in order to be able to produce in the product market.
Finally, in stage 4, ﬁrms compete in oligopoly fashion.
3. Government and private incentives for restructuring
To examine the incentives for restructuring faced by the government and a private ﬁrm,
we shall solve the model for the equilibrium restructuring and investment pattern. As
usual, we proceed by backward induction.
3.1. Stage 4 : product market equilibrium
We ﬁrst describe optimal behavior in the product market interaction. Firm i = {A,NA},
where A denotes the acquirer and NA denotes the non-acquirer, chooses an action xi ∈
R+ to maximize its direct product market proﬁt, Πi(xi,x j,k i,k j), which depends on its
own and its rivals market actions, xi and xj, as well as its own and the rival’s capital
investments, ki and kj, undertaken prior to the market interaction. We may think of the
highest bidder. In some transition countries, a substantial proportion of the shares of all ﬁrms
was given to the general population free. Most privatization programs combined several elements
of these basic methods. See Schmidt and Schnitzer (1997).
6 All ﬁrms are completely informed about their own and other ﬁrms’ characteristics. This
allows us to clearly attribute market force eﬀects, as opposed to, for instance, problems of
incomplete information.
6action xi as setting a quantity or a price, as will be shown in later sections. We assume that








j;ki,k j)=0 . (3.1)
Since the optimal actions xi and xj depend only ki and kj,w ec a nd e ﬁne a reduced-form
product market proﬁtf o rﬁrm i as follows:




j (ki,k j),k i). (3.2)
We shall assume that the reduced-form product market proﬁt Ri(ki,k j) is strictly increas-









To keep the exposition simple we use the derivatives of reduced-form product market




∂kj , keeping in mind that these summarize the total
eﬀe c t so nt h ep r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁts. These total eﬀects are spelled out in detail in the
Appendix A.1.
As also shown in Appendix A.1, Assumption 1 holds in the Linear-Quadratic Cournot
model used in section 4. But assumption 1 is also compatible with other oligopoly models.
For example, Farrell and Shapiro (1996) show that under Cournot competition and under
general assumptions on demand and costs, that an increase in capital for a ﬁrm (i) increases
7this ﬁrm’s proﬁt, while (ii) decreasing the proﬁts of its competitors. Moreover, using a
quantity-setting conjectural variation oligopoly model under a set of stability criteria, Dixit
(1986) shows that a change, which is prima facie favorable for a ﬁrm, as is an increase
in eﬀective capital, reduces the proﬁts of all other ﬁrms. Finally, it can be shown that
Assumption 1 extends to a linear Bertrand model with diﬀerentiated goods.
3.2. Stage 3: Optimal investment by the non-acquirer
The non-acquirer makes its investment decision, kNA, taking as given the investment made
by the acquirer, kA.T ohighlight simply the diﬀerent incentives for restructuring facing the
government and the acquirer, we assume without loss of generality that a non-acquiring
ﬁrm faces a discrete investment decision, kNA = ¯ k,w h i c hi sa l w a y sp r o ﬁtable, i.e. we
assume RNA(¯ k,kA) − F>0,w h e r eF is a ﬁxed investment cost. While simplifying the
exposition, this assumption is not crucial and in the Appendix A.4 we show that continuous
investments for the non-acquirer can also be included.
It is then convenient to deﬁne the total proﬁt for the non-acquirer as the reduced
product market proﬁt net of the investment cost, and write this as a function of the
acquirer’s investment, kA:
πNA(kA) ≡ RNA(¯ k,kA) − F (3.3)
where we can note that from Assumption 1, πNA(kA) is strictly decreasing in the acquirer’s
investment, kA.
83.3. Stage 2: Optimal Restructuring (sequential investments) by the acquirer
To describe the investment decision by the acquirer, let us again deﬁne total proﬁta st h e
reduced product market proﬁt, RA(kA), net of the investment cost:
πA(kA) ≡ RA(kA) − C(kA;kG) (3.4)
where C(kA;kG) is the total cost of restructuring state assets, given the choice of the
government, kG. We assume that the marginal cost to be increasing and convex, i.e.
C0(kA;kG) ≥ 0 and C00(kA;kG) ≥ 0. N o t et h a tw eo m i tt h ei n v e s t m e n tb yt h en o n -
acquirer as an argument since kNA = ¯ k is ﬁxed by assumption. We shall also assume that




Given the choice of government, kG, the acquirer maximizes its total proﬁt πA(kA) in









To proceed, we deﬁne the optimal choice by the acquiring ﬁrm if the government would
not invest at all (i.e. kG = k0),a skA
A. Maximizing (3.4), kA









A is illustrated in point A in the upper diagram in Figure 3.1. As also shown in














































Figure 3.1: Comparison of government and private incentives to restructuring.
Hence, whenever kA
A ≤ kG, the acquiring ﬁrm refrains from restructuring and just uses
the (cost-less) capacity installed by the government, k∗
A = kG.G i v e nt h a tkA
A >k G,t h e
optimal capacity k∗
A = kA
A is given from (3.6).
103.4. Stage 1: The privatization procedure
The privatization auction will be solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strate-
gies.7
Let us ﬁrst turn to the ﬁrms’ valuations of the state assets. The valuation for ﬁrm i,
vi, is deﬁned vi ≡ πA(k∗
A)−πNA(k∗
A),w h e r eπNA(k∗
A) denotes the reduced-form total proﬁt
made by ﬁrm i when ﬁrm j has acquired the state assets and πA(k∗
A) denotes the reduced-
form total proﬁtm a d eb yﬁrm i when it has acquired the state assets itself, and where
k∗
A is the optimal investment by the acquirer given from (3.7). Since ﬁrms are symmetric
ex-ante, it also follows that vi = vj.
In the case of two ﬁrms in the industry, the analysis is straightforward as shown by
the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Let ﬁrm i be the ﬁrm with the highest valuation. The state assets are then
acquired by ﬁrm i,a tap r i c ee q u a lt oﬁrm j’s valuation of obtaining the state assets
instead of ﬁrm i, vj.
Proof. See the Appendix.
We now proceed to the government’s restructuring decision.
3.5. Stage 0: Optimal Restructuring by the government
In period 0, the government internalizes the dependency of the acquirer’s capacity invest-
ment, k∗
A,o ni t so w ni n v e s t m e n t ,kG. To focus on strategic product market eﬀects, we
7 There is assumed to be a smallest monetary unit, denoted ε. We assume ties to be randomly
broken, and all equalities in valuations to be ruled out. The smallest amount ε is chosen such
that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
11assume that the government maximizes the net acquisition price, i.e., the acquisition price
net the restructuring cost, which from Lemma 1 can be written, P = vj − C(kG),w h e r e
vj is the non-acquirer’s valuation. We then assume that the government and the acquirer
face the same cost function when restructuring, C(k). The implications of relaxing these
assumptions are discussed in the concluding section.
In order to describe the governments restructuring problem, it is again convenient
to write the acquisition price as a function of reduced-form proﬁts net of investment
costs. From (3.7), it follows that the reduced form product market proﬁts RA(kA) and
RNA(kA), can be written as a direct functions of kG. Using the symmetry among the








A − kG) − πNA(kA
A) − C(kG),k G <k A
A






A −kG) and πNA(kA
A)=RNA(kA
A)−F.T h u s ,t h eﬁrst-
line in (3.8) shows the acquisition price when the acquirer invests (restructures) kA
A−kG > 0
sequentially upon the acquisition, whereas the second line in (3.8) indicates the acquisition
price when the acquirer uses all the government’s restructured capital (without sequential
investment), kA
A = kG.
The government´s maximization problem is illustrated in the lower diagram in Figure
3.1. Foreseeing the acquirer´s optimal restructuring , k∗
A, the marginal beneﬁt of restruc-
turing for kG ≤ kA
A is simply C0(k). The government then only aﬀects the cost of achieving
the acquirer’s optimal restructuring, kA
A, but these cost savings for the acquirer directly
12increases the acquisition price, leaving the net acquisition price P unchanged. This follows
directly from (3.7) where the level kA is not changed.
However, if we suppose that the government reﬂects on a capacity choice kG >k A
A,
making use of (3.3), the ﬁrst-order condition from maximizing the acquisition price P(kG)











where we shall assume that C(k) is suﬃciently convex so that P is strictly concave in kG.
The optimal kG is indicated as k
G
G in the lower diagram in Figure 3.1. Comparing
expressions (3.6) and (3.9), we see that the government has stronger incentives to invest
in capacity than the acquiring ﬁr m . T h i si sb e c a u s et h eg o v e r n m e n ta c h i e v e sah i g h e r
acquisition price by not only taking into account the increase in proﬁts for the acquirer,
but also by exploiting the negative externalities on the non-acquirer, captured by the last
term
dRNA
dkG which is negative from Assumption 1. This is also illustrated in Figure 3.1,
where we may note that it is indeed also optimal for the acquiring ﬁrm to fully use the
government investment.
Thus we have the following result:
Proposition 1. The government has a stronger incentive to restructure the state assets
than the acquiring ﬁrm, since it internalizes the negative eﬀect of restructuring on the
non-acquiring ﬁrm’s proﬁt through the sale price.
In the introduction, we posed the question of why a government would restructure state
assets for sale instead of leaving it to a future buyer to decide. The private buyer should
13be able to achieve restructuring at the same cost and more in line with her speciﬁc needs.
However, Proposition 1 illustrates that in an oligopoly, restructuring will have strategic
product market eﬀects which increase sales revenue by taking advantage of market rivalry
among ﬁrms (by improving the competitive position of the acquiring ﬁrm while worsening
the competitive position of the non-acquiring ﬁrm). This may provide the government
with incentives to restructure prior to privatization.
Finally, we have assumed that the timing of investments/restructuring is: (1) the gov-
ernment, (2) the acquirer, and (3) the non-acquirer. If the timing of the investment was
instead, (1) the government, and (2) the acquirer and the non-acquirer investing simul-
taneously, it can be shown that the incentive for the government to restructure relative
to the acquirer would increase further. The reason being that the government then has a
possibility of committing to large investment, a commitment not available to the private
buyer. If all investment take place simultaneously by all players, i.e. (i) the government,
the acquirer and the non-acquirer, this ﬁrst-mover advantage for the government is lost.
However, because the government internalizes the externalities on rival ﬁrms via the sales
price, it still has a stronger incentive to restructure than the acquirer.
4. Why speed may be important in privatizations
While the result in the previous section provides an argument why governments use re-
structuring programs, the importance of selling the domestic assets quickly has also been
highlighted. Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) has shown that a slow selling in the Mexican privati-
zation program lead to a substantially lower sales price. A slow sale of the assets may lead
14to lower productivity due to, for instance, managerial distraction, misconduct and lost
investment opportunities.8 In a situation without oligopolistic interaction the acquisition
price would decrease with the amount of waste. However, in an oligopoly a slow sale of
the state assets will have strategic investment and product market eﬀects that aﬀect the
sales price in an involved way. In this section we will study these strategic eﬀects in more
detail.
To this end we apply a Linear-Quadratic model which allows to us derive analytical
unique solutions for the optimal behavior by ﬁrms at all stages of the game. For complete-
ness, we relax the assumption of ﬁxed investments by the non-acquiring ﬁrm. This type
of framework, typically modelling an investment game followed by a stage with oligopoly
interaction, has been applied in for example, Neary (2002), Neary and Leahy (1997) and
d’Aspremont and Jaquemin (1988). A central diﬀerence between these papers and our
study, is that our application examines the eﬀects of adding an acquisition game to the
oligopoly- and investment interaction.
In order to highlight the strategic investment and product market eﬀects of a slow sale,
we assume that the government fails to restructure when trying, i.e. we assume that the
state assets remain at k0 after restructuring. The results in this section would also hold if
this assumption was relaxed, but the analysis would then be much more tedious.
In Section 4.1 we investigate the case where a slow sale implies that the buyer loses its
possibility of committing to sequential investments.
In Section 4.2 we allow diﬀerent types of capital to have diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrms’
8 On the other hand, incentives may not deteriorate if career concerns make managers of SOEs
eager to establish a good reputation in the labor market. See Roland and Sekkat (2000).
15production possibilities. This implies that we can identify other situations where a slow
sale of the state assets might cause a substantial fall in the acquisition price as a result of
strategic eﬀects.
4.1. Delayed privatization: ﬁrst-mover advantage in investments
In this section, we assume that an acquisition provides the acquiring ﬁrm with a ﬁrst-mover
advantage in the investment game, allowing this ﬁrm to act ﬁrst as a "Stackelberg-leader".
However, this position is only attainable given that privatization takes place with speed
(henceforth, indicated S). In contrast, a delay in the privatization (henceforth, indicated
D) causes a loss of the the ﬁrst-mover advantage for the acquirer, which implies that the
investment game takes place in simultaneous moves (stage two and three of the game
taking place simultaneously).
4.1.1. The product market
The game is solved by backward induction. We model the oligopoly interaction in the
last stage as Cournot competition in homogeneous goods. Let the inverse demand in the
product market be given by (4.1):
P = a − b(qi + qj) (4.1)
where qi and qj are the quantities produced by ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j, a>0 is a demand
parameter, b may be interpreted as the (inverse) size of the market. The product market
proﬁtf o rﬁrm i, Πi(qi,q j,k i,k j),c a nb ew r i t t e n :
Πi =( P − ci)qi (4.2)
16where we assume that the ﬁrm’s marginal cost, ci, is decreasing in its own capital owner-
ship:
ci = c − ki (4.3)




Λ +2 ki − kj
3b
(4.4)
where Λ = a − c>0.
From (4.1), the ﬁrst-order condition (3.1) can be re-written P − ci = bqi. Hence, the
reduced-form product market proﬁts deﬁned in (3.2), Ri(ki,k j),t a k et h ef o r m :
Ri(ki,k j)=b
µ





Let us start with the case where the privatized assets are sold slowly, which as stated
a b o v ei m p l i e st h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n tg a m et a k e sp l a c ei ns i m u l t a n e o u sm o v e s .
The total proﬁtf o rﬁrm i can then be written:
πi(ki,k j) ≡ Ri(ki,k j) − Ci(ki) (4.6)






For simplicity, we assume that all ﬁrms share the same investment technology in terms
of the cost-parameter µ.F i r m i then invests in capital ki, taking as given the capital















The reaction function of the non-acquirer is illustrated in Figure 4.1 where it is inverted





kNA,w h e r e9
4µb − 2 > 0 is assumed to ensure a

















(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 4)
(4.11)
w h e r ei tc a nb es h o w nt h a t(3bµ − 4) > 0 ensures uniqueness and stability and where N D
indicates simultaneous Nash-solution under delayed privatization.
Let us now turn to the case where the privatized ﬁrm is sold fast. The acquirer will
then have a ﬁrst mover advantage. The acquirer will choose its investment internalizing
the non-acquirer’s behavior through the reaction function (4.9). We can then rewrite the
total proﬁt of the acquirer in (3.4) as:































Figure 4.1: The investment game under speedy (S) and delayed privation (D)w i t hh o -
mogenous capital.
19Using the reaction function (4.9) and the reduced proﬁtp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt( 4 . 5 ) ,













Using the investment cost function (4.7), the reaction function (4.9) and the reduced proﬁt
product market proﬁt (4.5), it can be shown that the optimal investment by the acquirer,
denoted kA
A, and the subsequent investment by non-acquirer, denoted kA
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Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
160bµ − 216b2µ2 +8 1 b3µ3 − 32
(4.15)




and 9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8> 0 is assumed to have positive investments by the non-acquirer,
and where AS indicates the "Stackelberg-solution" under speedy privatization.
Comparing the outcomes under delayed (D) and speedy (S) privatization, we can state
the following Lemma.





Proof. See, the Appendix.
Lemma 2 is also illustrated in Figure 4.1. Note that under delayed privatization (N D),
the ﬁrst-mover advantage for the acquirer is lost and the acquirer cannot commit to a
large investment and hence reduces its sequential investments as compared to the case
of speedy privatization (AS). In contrast, the corresponding change for the non-acquirer
involves an increase in investments.
204.1.3. Eﬀects on the acquisition price
T u r n i n gt ot h ee ﬀect of the acquisition price of a slow sale. To illustrate the eﬀects of a
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iso-proﬁt curves are denoted ¯ πl
i and are also shown in Figure 4.1. For instance, ¯ πA
A is
then the acquirer’s reduced-form total proﬁt when privatization takes place with speed.




as the diﬀerence in acquisition price under delayed (D)
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As again illustrated in Figure 4.1, ﬁrms’ valuation of the state assets are reduced from
a delay of the privatization. Formally, expression (4.16) then shows that the acquisition
price is reduced for two reasons: First, the ﬁrst-mover advantage is lost for the acquirer,
w h i c hf r o mL e m m a2a n d( 4 . 5 )reduces the acquirer’s proﬁt. Second, the loss of ﬁrst-mover
advantage of the acquirer also improves the competitive position of the non-acquirer, which
from Lemma 2 and (4.5), leads to an increase in this ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
Therefore, a slow sale then reduces ﬁrms willingness to pay, since the delay reduces the
acquirer’s proﬁt, while the proﬁt of the non-acquiring ﬁrms increases. In sum:
Proposition 2. A slow sale of state assets which removes the acquirer’s ﬁrst-mover ad-
vantage in the investment game, reduces the sales price for two reasons: (i) it reduces
the acquiring ﬁrm’s product market proﬁt, and (ii) it increases the non-acquiring ﬁrm’s
21product market proﬁt.
4.2. Delayed privatization: depreciation of irreplaceable assets and other ﬁrst-
mover advantages
In the analysis so far we have treated the state assets, restructured assets and new assets
as perfect substitutes. However, these diﬀerent types of capital might have signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent eﬀects on ﬁrms’ production possibilities. In some situations, the state assets
may be unique and irreplaceable. For example unique land or natural resources might
be destroyed by misconduct during a slow sale. Another situation is when early entry
provide the acquiring ﬁrm with a competitive advantage in the ensuing product market
competition. For example, an early entry might give the acquirer an opportunity to create
consumer loyalty before rival ﬁrms enter the market.
To model heterogenous capital of this kind, let the marginal cost for ﬁrm i be:
ci =¯ ci − ki, where: ¯ cNA = c, ¯ cA = c − γ
lk0 (4.17)
In (4.17) ki 6= k0 again denotes invested (new) capital in stage two. Asymmetries between
ﬁrms are captured by the intercept term, ¯ ci, which measures the impact on ﬁrm i’s absolute
eﬃciency level of the possession of all other assets (such as ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets or acquired
state assets) prior to investment in new assets, ki, in stage 2.9 Hence, state assets k0
and new assets ki are assumed to be imperfect substitutes. k0 may, for instance, provide
knowledge of the market, thereby providing assets distinct from new investments ki,w h i c h
9 Assuming that asymmetries between ﬁrms enter through the intercept term ¯ ci in the marginal
cost ci =¯ ci − ki simpliﬁes the calculations. Alternatively, we could assume that ﬁrms diﬀer in
their investment costs for new investments (µi). Qualitatively, this yields similar results.
22provide a capacity to produce. To capture the eﬀect of delayed privatization, we introduce
the eﬃciency parameter γl and make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: γS >γ D
We noted above that a slow or delayed privatization might lead to (i) unique assets
being depreciated or destroyed while waiting, or that (ii) ﬁrst mover advantages from an
early entry (such as creating consumer loyalties) may not materialize.10 Assumption 2
captures both these features of a delay assuming that the "eﬀective size" of the former
state assets, as captured by the parameter γl, is larger when privatization take place with
speed (l = S) than with a delay (l = D), that is, γSk0 >γ Dk0.
Let us then turn to the investment game. To highlight the eﬀect of delay in this
context of unique state assets, we shall assume investment into new assets take place
simultaneously (i.e. stage two and three of the game take place simultaneously).11 We
need then merely to replace ﬁrms’ marginal costs in (4.3) with the marginal cost in (4.17).
The reaction function of the non-acquirer then becomes:
kN(kA)=









kNA,w h e r e9
4µb−2 > 0 is again assumed to ensure a downward-sloping reaction
10 Note that we model the beneﬁts of an acquisition as a reduction of the marginal cost. Alter-
natively, acquired assets could aﬀect consumers willingness to pay. If goods were diﬀerentiated,
an acquisition would then aﬀect the intercept of the a acquirer’s demand function, which could
capture that this ﬁrm is able to create some type of consumer loyalty before the entry of a rival
ﬁrm. While involving more algebra, such an extension does not qualitatively change results.
11Assuming Stackelberg-leadership for the acquirer would not lead to any qualitative change in results.





Figure 4.2 also illustrates the eﬀects of a delay in the privatization. Since, from As-
sumption 2, this leads to a less eﬃcient ownership of the state assets, the reaction function
of the acquirer shifts inwards from RA(γSk0) to RA(γDk0), whereas the reaction function
of the non-acquirer shifts out from RN(γSk0) to RN(γDk0). Similar to the preceding sec-
tion this occurs, because with less eﬃcient ownership of state assets the acquirer cannot
commit to a large investment and hence reduce its sequential investments as compared
to the case of speedy privatization (N S). Likewise, the corresponding change for the
non-acquirer again involves an increase in investments.




Λ(3bµ − 4) + 2γlk0 (3bµ − 2)
(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 4)




Λ(3bµ − 4) − 3γlk0bµ
(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 4)
, l = {S,D} (4.20)
from which we can derive the following Lemma 3 by using Assumption 2:
Lemma 3. In the Linear-Quadratic model with heterogenous capital, kN S
A >k N D
A and
kN S
NA <k N D
NA .




j) as the reduced-total proﬁtf o rﬁrm i under delayed or speedy sale,
respectively, i.e. l =
¡
N D,N S¢
and let ¯ πl
i be the corresponding iso-proﬁt curve. Then,
deﬁne PD−S = PND−P
NS
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4 b  2 kNA
Figure 4.2: The investment game under speedy (S) and delayed privation (D)w i t hh e t -
erogenous capital.
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As shown in Figure 4.2, it again follows that ﬁrms’ valuation of the state assets are
again reduced from a delay of the privatization. Expression (4.16) then shows that the
acquisition price is reduced for two reasons: First, as the acquirer can less eﬃciently use
the former state assets (due to depletion or weaker complementarities) the acquirer face a
less advantageous position in the investment game, which from Lemma 2 and expression
(4.5) reduces the acquirer’s proﬁt. Second, this also improves the competitive position of
the non-acquirer, which from Lemma 2 and (4.5), leads to an increase in this ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
Thus, a slow sale of the state assets reduces ﬁrms’ willingness to pay also in a situation
there state assets have an element of uniqueness. We have the following result:
Proposition 3. A slow sale of the state assets which causes depreciation of irreplaceable
state assets or restricts the acquirer’s possibility to exploit non-commitment ﬁrst mover
advantages, reduces the sales price for two reasons (i) it reduces the acquiring ﬁrm’s
product market proﬁt ,a n d( i i )i ti n c r e a s e st h en o n - a c q u i r i n gﬁr m ’ sp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt.
5. Concluding discussion
In this paper, we have shown that government policies used in times of investment liber-
alizations, such as restructuring and the timing of sales, can be explained through their
strong eﬀect on the sales price of the domestic assets. We have shown that the govern-
26ment may have a stronger incentive to restructure than the acquirer, since it internalizes
externalities on rival ﬁrms via the sales price of the target ﬁrm in the host country. An
acquirer restructuring only takes into account how much its own proﬁt will increase. The
government, on the other hand, takes into account how the sales price increases; it in-
creases from an increased proﬁt for the acquiring ﬁrm, but also from a lower proﬁtf o rt h e
non-acquiring ﬁrm, whose proﬁts decreases as a result of its rival’s restructuring.
While this provides an argument for restructuring programs, a quick sale of the do-
mestic assets is also shown to be important. A slow sale of domestic assets might imply
that the ﬁrst mover advantage from entering by an acquisition of a privatized ﬁrm is re-
duced, since entry by rivals then becomes closer in time. The slow sale will then reduce
the sales price for two reasons: (i) it reduces the acquiring ﬁr m ’ sp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt,
and (ii) it increases the non-acquiring ﬁr m ’ sp r o d u c tm a r k e tp r o ﬁt and thus reduces the
non-acquirer’s willingness to pay for the assets.
To summarize, we have thus shown that government restructuring can be rationalized
as a way of taking advantage of market rivalry and bidding competition in order to extract
a higher acquisition price. However, if such a strategy fails or is too prolonged, the same
forces can also lower the acquisition price considerably. Whether a government should
opt for the potential rewards associated with restructuring, or simply sell while the state
assets are in demand, is highly case-speciﬁc and will depend on the nature of the state
assets, the degree of competition on the relevant market, the government’s ability to
restructure etc. In the Mexican privatization program it seems that restructuring was
counterproductive as indicated by the following quote from Lopez-de-Silanes (1997): ”A
27key lesson in privatizations is: do not do too much. Just sell”.
The model used is of course restrictive in several dimensions. First, it might be ques-
tionable as to whether the government has the ability to restructure as eﬃciently as the
buyer. In particular it seems reasonable to believe that governments abstain from restruc-
turing in situations where their own technology is substantially inferior to the potential
buyer’s technology. However, the above ﬁnding might explain why a government does
restructure, even though it is inferior in restructuring. Second, the bidders valuation of
the state assets might diﬀer substantially. For example, the acquirer might have ﬁrm spe-
ciﬁc assets matching particularly well the assets for sale. The acquirer might then have
a stronger incentive to restructure. To see this, note that the acquisition price equals the
valuation of the state assets for the ﬁrm with the second highest valuation. This ﬁrm’s
valuation might then not be so sensitive to restructuring, while the acquirer’s proﬁti s .
However, note also that the reverse might be true. It then follows that the government’s
incentive to restructure relative to the acquirer increases even further.
T of o c u so ns t r a t e g i cp r o d u c tm a r k e te ﬀe c t s ,w eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eg o v e r n m e n t
maximizes the revenues from the sale of the state assets. In practise, it seems that revenues
are in fact an important part of the objective function when privatizations takes place.
However, in a welfare analysis, eﬀects on consumers and other domestic ﬁrms might also be
taken into account. The consumer eﬀect would likely increase the government’s incentive
to restructure, since restructuring would likely lead to lower prices. However, business
stealing from domestic rivals will then decrease the incentive for restructuring by the
g o v e r n m e n t ,t h et o t a le ﬀect then being ambiguous.
28A. Appendix:







































Hence, the total eﬀect for ﬁrm i from obtaining more capital is positive, which from (A.1)
implies that the sum of the indirect eﬀect (which cancels through the envelope theorem,
∂Πi




dki ,a ﬀecting proﬁts through
∂Πi
∂xj )a n dt h edirect eﬀect (the term
∂Πi
∂ki ), is
positive. Conversely, (A.2) implies that the strategic eﬀect when a competitor obtains






∂xj ), is negative.













∂xi < 0 holds (noting that x∗
i = q∗
i), which implies that (A.1) and (A.2) and hence
Assumption 1 is fulﬁlled in the Linear-Quadratic Cournot model. This can also be checked
by a direct calculation from (4.5).
A.2. Proof of Lemma 1
Let vi >v j without loss of generality. First, consider the equilibrium candidate where
ﬁrm i acquires the state assets. Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗,w h e r eb∗
i >b ∗
j,
j 6= i. Let owner i be the owner obtaining the state assets. Note that b∗
i >v i is a weakly
29dominated strategy, since no owner will post a bid over its maximum valuation of obtaining
the assets. If b∗
i <v j, ﬁrm j beneﬁts from deviating to b∗∗
j = b∗
i + ε, since it then obtains
the assets and pays a price for the assets lower than its valuation of obtaining them. Last,
consider candidate b∗
i = vj,b ∗
j = vj −ε. Then, no owner has an incentive to deviate. Thus,
this is a Nash equilibrium and the only NE where ﬁrm i obtains the assets.
Let us now show that this is the only Nash equilibrium. First, consider the situation
where ﬁrm j obtains the assets. Consider the equilibrium candidate b∗,w h e r eb∗
j >b ∗
i,
j 6= i. But we know that in equilibrium, b∗
j <v j,s i n c eﬁrm j otherwise plays a weakly
dominated strategy. But if b∗
j <v j, ﬁrm i beneﬁts from deviating to b∗∗
i = b∗
j + ε, since
it then obtains the assets and pays a price which is lower than its valuation of obtaining
them. Thus, ﬁrm j obtaining the assets is not an equilibrium.
Second, note that the situation where neither ﬁrm i nor ﬁrm j obtains the assets cannot
occur if there is no reservation price at the auction.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 2






Λ(3bµ − 4)(9bµ − 8)bµ
(160bµ − 216b2µ2 +8 1 b3µ3 − 32)(3bµ − 4)(9bµ − 4)
> 0 (A.3)
It then follows from the reaction function (4.9) that kAS
NA <k ND
NA.
A.4. Government restructuring in the linear Cournot model
Here, we solve for the government restructuring in linear Cournot model, showing that
results derived in section 3 can be derived when the non-acquirer faces a continuous in-
30vestment decision.
Assume (i) that the government faces identical investment costs as the ﬁrms, (ii) that
t h et i m i n gi st h eo n ei nF i g u r e2 . 1 ,w h e r et h ea c q u i r e rh a saﬁrst-mover advantage and (iii)
that capital is homogenous as in section 4.1. It is straightforward to also extend results
to the analysis in section 4.2 with heterogenous capital. Let us, in contrast to the latter
sections, also assume (iv) that the government is able to restructure. The government
maximizes the acquisition price, P = vi. To derive the government’s optimal restructuring,
k
G
G, assume (v) that this level of investment is larger than the optimal investment by the
acquirer, kAS






G. Making use of the reduced-proﬁt functions Ri(ki,k j) from (4.5)




Λ(27b2µ2 − 44bµ +1 6 )





Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
(3bµ − 4)(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 2)
(A.5)







(3bµ−2)(3bµ−4)(9bµ−4)(160bµ−216b2µ2+81b3µ3−32) > 0 (A.6)
where (3bµ − 2)(3bµ − 4)(9bµ−4) > 0 by the second order condition for the government’s




(9bµ−8)b < 0,w h e r e160bµ − 216b2µ2 +






(9bµ−8)2b ,a n dw h e r e9b2µ2−20bµ+8 > 0 is required for kAS
NA >
0 in (4.15). Note that from (A.6) our above assumption (v) is fulﬁlled and the government’s
optimal restructuring exceeds the acquirer’s optimal restructuring (investment). It is then
31indeed optimal for the acquirer to use k
G
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